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Motivation and Sorting of Human Capital in Open Innovation
Sharon Belenzon and Mark Schankerman
May 15, 2014
Abstract
This paper studies how business models can be designed to tap e¤ectively into open innovation la-
bor markets with heterogeneously motivated workers. Using data on open source software, we show that
motivations are diverse, and demonstrate how managers can strategically inuence the ow of code con-
tributions and their impact on project performance. Unlike previous literature using survey data, we
exploit the observed pattern of project membership and code contributions the revealed preferenceof
developers to infer the motivations driving their decision to contribute. Developers strongly sort along
key dimensions of the business model chosen by project managers, especially the degree of openness of
the project license. The results indicate an important role for intrinsic motivation, reputation, and labor
market signaling, and a more limited role for reciprocity.
Keywords: strategic human capital, sorting, motivations, open innovation, open source, intellectual
property rights
1. Introduction
Strategy research explores how heterogeneity in rm resources can lead to di¤erential performance. Within
this view, employees are among the most important types of rent-generating resources, due to scarcity,
specialization, and tacit knowledge. Building on resource-based theory, the human capital management
literature has suggested policies designed to increase employee motivation in the face of several important
challenges. Unlike physical assets, workers can freely leave the rm (Co¤, 1997; Co¤ and Kryscynski, 2011),
their contribution to performance is hard to observe, and their actions may be driven by diverse motivations,
especially in knowledge-intensive activities (Sauermann and Cohen, 2010).
This paper focuses on an understudied link between business strategy and human capital namely, that
the ability to tap into a pool of talent is strongly related to the specic business model chosen by managers.
Our paper studies this link in the context of open source software (OSS). In OSS, source code contributors
are typically unpaid and the source code is available for anyone to use and modify under project-specic
conditions. This innovation model allows us to isolate the impact a specic business model has on the
composition and quality of human capital. The main feature we focus on in this paper is the degree of
property rights protection that is chosen by the project manager. OSS plays an important role in the
commercialization strategies of software rms. Companies often comingle the development of open source
and proprietary products, where nearly 40% of software rms participate in both proprietary and open source
development and more than 30% of these rms devote at least half of their computer developerstime to OSS
(Lerner and Schankerman, 2010). Importantly in our context, evidence suggests that rms tend to adopt a
diverse set of business models that involve varying degrees of property rights, ranging from fully proprietary
to more open intellectual property regimes (Lerner and Schankerman, 2010; Fosfuri et al., 2008). Our focus
in this paper is on the labor market-implications of selecting varying degrees of property rights protection
and underscores an important and understudied tradeo¤ between stronger property rights and sorting of
intrinsically motivated workers.
We highlight ve features that make OSS particularly interesting for strategic human capital research.
First, OSS is based on team production, rendering the level and quality of e¤ort di¢ cult to observe. In
the absence of direct monitoring, aligning incentives between the developer and the project manager plays
a major role. Second, OSS participants are not formally employed by the organization with which they
are a¢ liated, which makes informal relationships, one of the core subjects of the human capital literature,
a central issue. Third, the ease of worker mobility manifests itself most pervasively in OSS, which raises
the question of how organizations can generate a successful human capital strategy in an extremely uid
labor market with no formal contracts to bind workers. Fourth, OSS communities are known for their
diverse motivations, which range from highly ideological (intrinsic) to more careerist (extrinsic) concerns.
In this setting, understanding worker motivations can help rms design better employment contracts that
compensate workers on the basis of what they care about, and allow workers to sort into organizations
characterized by resonant goals. Fifth, OSS is an extremely decentralized system of organizing innovation
activity workers have full autonomy over the tasks they perform. A recent paper by Gambardella et al.
(2013) argues that providing workers with more autonomy can create a loss for the rm due to misaligned
objectives, but at the same time can increase private benets for workers mitigating agency problems. This
argument suggests that under some conditions, rms may choose to create a decentralized system similar
to what we observe in OSS. Our paper contributes to this discussion by studying how to organize inventive
activity in the presence of heterogeneous worker motivations. In our setting, all workers are autonomous,
but they vary in how much they value this autonomy relative to other sources of private benets. At the
same time, rms di¤er in their costs of attracting and motivating workers through forgone property rights.
We argue that the matching driven by heterogeneity  at the level of the worker and the rm (business
model) is understudied and should be a more central theme at the intersection between business strategy
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and strategic human capital domains.
Our empirical strategy is to utilize revealed preferences, as captured by the observed pattern of project
membership and source code contributions, to quantify how reputation, reciprocity, utility, and intrinsic
motivations drive open source innovation. Our empirical analysis of source code contributions is based
on a large-scale data set with detailed information on the contributing and receiving OSS projects. Each
contribution includes a dyad with a contributing project, where the contributor is a registered member, and a
receiving project to which the source code is submitted. The distinction between contributing and receiving
projects is central to our empirical analysis, because we seek to establish whether developers a¢ liated with
certain types of contributing projects systematically target certain kinds of receiving projects. The key
variation comes from projects variation in the degree to which their licenses are "open." Though open,
unrestricted access was the original driving force behind the "free software" movement (Raymond, 2001),
many projects now incorporate OSS contributions under a variety of licenses that allow the source code to
be used in proprietary ways that limit terms of use. For clarity, we refer to the latter as "closed" projects.
To study sorting, we exploit project characteristics such as license type, size, programming language,
operating system, and intended audience. We study the empirical determinants of contributions by focusing
on four distinct groups of developers, whose prole we infer based on to the types of open source licenses that
govern the projects with which they are a¢ liated: open, closed, mixed, and anonymous. We investigate how
the pattern of contributions from each developer type varies across the characteristics of the contributing-
receiving dyads. The key innovation in our approach is that we exploit the observed pattern of contributions
the "revealed preferences" of developers to infer the underlying motivations, unlike earlier work that is based
on survey information. Our econometric approach is to aggregate source code contributions into cells dened
by a set of detailed characteristics of the contributing developers and receiving projects, and then to use
these cells as the observations in the estimation procedure. We then show how the likelihood of source code
contribution varies with the motivation of the contributing developer, and the potential (intrinsic/extrinsic)
reward associated with matching the contributor to specic bundles of receiving project characteristics. We
nd that the heterogeneity of motivations in the open source community leads to systematic sorting of
developers on key dimensions of business model choices managers make, including the openness of project
license, project size, intended audience and corporate sponsorship.
Can sorting be a source of competitive advantage? Gottschalg and Zollo (2007) address this question
by introducing the concept of interest alignment into competitive strategy research. In their view, the
answer depends on whether rms di¤er in the costs or benets of implementing protable sorting between
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workers and rms. In the context of OSS, the openness of the license a¤ects the ow of contributions
from di¤erent types of developers, and in particular, the mix of intrinsically motivated versus commercially
oriented developers. The costs of a more open license is weaker property rights over the resulting source
code. The managers choice regarding license type will depend on the balance between these two forces.
Competitive advantage can arise only if the balance between these costs and benets varies across rms in
ways that are di¢ cult to imitate. Evidence by Schankerman and Lerner (2010) suggest such variation exists.
They show that the degree to which rms comingle the development of open source and proprietary software
varies substantially, as do the specic types of software license modes and business models they use to do
so. For example, they nd that companies that develop proprietary software are more likely to engage in
exports (where protection is more important) than rms that focus on open source. Fosfuri et al. (2008)
also present evidence suggesting that rms di¤er in their ability to prot from open source, and that this
ability is strongly related to heterogeneity in complementary downstream capabilities.
In summary, our ndings illustrate that business model design can have important labor market impli-
cations, especially when intrinsically motivated developers are an important part of the labor force. We
provide econometric evidence that the heterogeneity of motivations is closely linked to the optimal design
of business models for knowledge workers in open innovation. Specically, we demonstrate and quantify the
presence of a tradeo¤ between stronger property rights project managers choose and the ow of contributions
the project receives from the most productive, intrinsically motivated, developers.
2. OSS as a Window into Open Innovation Systems
The literature discusses open innovation in two distinct ways. The rst is an innovation model that op-
timally integrates internal and external markets. Whereas classical transaction cost economics focuses on
the allocation of activity between rms and markets, a new paradigm has emerged to emphasize the in-
tegration of rms and markets. This open innovation paradigm refers to the "use of external knowledge
ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to markets, as rms look to advance their
technology" (Chesbrough, 2003, p. 1). Technology markets lie at the heart of this literature because they
are key channels by which rms access critical technological knowledge and inputs (Arora et al., 2001). For
such markets to function e¤ectively, transacting parties need to have strong patent rights. Patents facilitate
technology exchange by reducing expropriation risk, acting as bargaining chips that enhance rmsability
to contract over bundles of technologies, and by enforcing patent rights without reliance on costly litigation.
In particular, patents help ensure knowledge access is limited to those rms that either create it, or to other
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transacting rms that create technologies that could be exchanged through market transactions.
A second strand of the literature views openness from a very di¤erent lens, characterizing it by the
proprietary nature of the intellectual property regime and the collectiveness of innovation (Baldwin and von
Hippel, 2011). This literature examines whether innovation can be sustained in the absence of patents. This
collective innovation model is aligned with Chesbroughs notion of openness in emphasizing the combination
of internal and external research, but this view treats patents as obstacles, not drivers, of technical progress.
In this perspective, private returns to R&D are realized through product market competition in the form
of improved products and services, but the innovation market remains open with rms drawing on and
contributing to a growing pool of common knowledge. Free riding is not presumed to be important, and for
this reason, patents should not have any positive e¤ect on R&D incentives.
OSS is an environment where both types of openness coexist. Open source builds on the successful
combination of internal and external code contributions, consistent with Chesbroughs view. At the same
time, developers receive no formal property rights over their code contributions, consistent with the collective
innovation model. However, the open source process also exhibits important "closed" elements. Whereas
some projects attract many external contributions to complement their internally developed code, the vast
majority of projects fail to attract any external contributions. Moreover, open source projects vary widely in
the nature of the associated intellectual proprietary rights. Whereas some projects restrict the commercial
use of code, others are much more exible. We emphasize that this choice of license type, along with other
characteristics we will study, is a key dimension of the business model managers must choose.
A central concern for policy makers and rms alike is the sustainability of open innovation systems
and the di¤erent domains where they can successfully ourish (Cohen, 2005). For open systems to be
sustainable, free-riding must be su¢ ciently mitigated: in the present context, the marginal private rewards
from individually contributing a source code must be larger than those from not contributing. von Hippel and
Krogh (2002) emphasize that what is required for free riding to be mitigated is "selective incentives" private
rewards that accrue only to contributing developers. To illustrate this point, suppose that developers have
a single motivation  improving their employment opportunities. By contributing to open source projects
developers, can signal their quality to potential employers, such as software rms. If those rms can easily
observe the e¤ort and quality of contributions, free riding would not be a concern, because selective incentives
would be large. Developers that do not contribute or those that make low-quality contributions would not
gain any private rewards, which means that even in the case of a single motivation, free-riding may not be
fatal.
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However, in some circumstances, rms cannot easily observe the level and quality of e¤ort. In such
cases, the heterogeneity of worker motivations and of the business models rms adopt to commercialize
their products become central for sustainability. Developers that seek to improve their technical skills, for
example, would contribute even when rms do not observe their e¤ort and quality. Thus, with non-pecuniary
incentives, contribution is now more likely than in the case in which career concern is the only motivation.
Further, if the "free-software" ideology also drives developers, contributions would be even more robust. If,
for instance, learning opportunities are exhausted as developers become more experienced, the free-software
ideology would ensure continued contributions. But for continued contributions driven by the free-software
ideology, rms need to o¤er motivated developers the opportunity to work on open projects. Thus the
open system is more likely to be sustainable when both workers have heterogeneous motivations and rms
adopt business models that e¤ectively exploit this worker heterogeneity. In our empirical work, we show that
diverse motivations lead developers to sort systematically on project characteristics and that this sorting can
be exploited by rms strategically to organize their projects to maximize the ow of contributions and their
impact on project performance.
3. Heterogenous Motivations and Sorting
Motivations fall into two broad classes: extrinsic and intrinsic. The concept of extrinsic motivation was
rst introduced by Skinner (1953) and further developed by Deci (1972), who dened extrinsically motivated
behaviors as those that are seen by actors as means to an end. When thusly motivated, actions are performed
merely to attain some separable outcome to which external rewards are attached (e.g., status, approval, or
monetary compensation). This is what most people in economics and management would associate with
"incentives". In the absence of a commensurably meaningful reward, the action would not be performed.
By contrast, an individual is considered intrinsically motivated to act if she "performs an activity for no
apparent reward except the activity itself" (Deci, 1972).
Intrinsic motivation has been especially important for the study of innovation. Several papers emphasize
the role of intrinsic motivations in supporting innovating activities, and specically that more science-oriented
jobs typically involve some degree of autonomy (Stern, 2004; Sauermann and Cohen, 2010). Our paper
complements this research in two ways. First, it demonstrates the presence of heterogeneous motivations
in OSS where "quasi-rms" and projects operate in a labor market environment without formal contracts
and highly mobile workforce (whereas most previous papers in the area focus on motivations within discrete
rms with formal labor contracts). Second, our paper underscores the importance of sorting the matching
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between worker preferences and project characteristics (business model).1
Studies of motivations in OSS have proposed four main explanations. First, developers may be intrinsi-
cally motivated to contribute by their strong identication with the "ideology" underlying the open source
movement (Raymond, 2001). The original open source license that embodies this view is the general purpose
license (GPL), which requires that the source code and any subsequent source code that builds on it or
embodies it must remain open source. Second, source code contribution and active participation in the OSS
community may enhance the developers reputation via peer recognition (Raymond, 2001) or commercial
rewards in the labor market (Lerner and Tirole, 2001, 2002; Johnson, 2002). Third, developers may expect
later gains from reciprocal contributions from projects to which they have previously contributed (Lakhani
and von Hippel, 2003). Fourth, developers may also enjoy (get utility value from) participation (Shah,
2006). Within each of these explanations exists some varying degree of both intrinsic and extrinsic moti-
vations, which have been treated empirically in a number of studies that are based on survey information
within an open source setting. But none of these studies developed a link between the choice of business
model and the ability of rms to tap into such heterogenous labor markets. Lakhani and Wolf (2005), using
survey instruments on a sample of OSS developers, nd that intrinsic motivation is the strongest driver of
contributions. A related paper is Roberts et al. (2006), who nd a role for both intrinsic and extrinsic
motivations, among other interesting ndings.
4. Development of Hypotheses
A number of survey-based papers have emphasized the importance of non-pecuniary motivations to contribute
to open source projects. These motivations include ideology, reciprocity, enjoyment, and technical learning
(Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Shah, 2006). Based on this literature, we identify three types of developers
as implied by the expected relative importance they attach to intrinsic motivation when making source code
contributions: open, closed, and mixed. We assume that developers reveal themselves as being intrinsically
motivated if they are members only of projects that have open licenses, because these projects adhere more
closely to the original OSS philosophy. Conversely, we assume developers reveal a preference for extrinsic
motivation if they belong only to projects with closed license types. We consider as mixed those developers
for which no clear evidence exists on whether their motivation is primarily intrinsic or extrinsic.
Building on prior literature, we identify four classes of motivations, from highly intrinsic to highly extrin-
sic: Pure intrinsic motivation, Utility/Learning, Reciprocity, and Reputation. The literature and available
1Scholarship in economics has historically not embraced the concept of intrinsic motivation, though in recent years it has
begun to garner more attention (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Besley and Ghatak, 2005).
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small-sample survey evidence suggest a role for each of these in open source development (e.g., Haruvy et al.;
Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003; Hertel et al., 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Of the four motivation types,
reputation relies most directly on extrinsic mechanisms: the very notion of reputationrequires an external
agent to form an opinion of the subject. At the other extreme, pure intrinsic motivation is simply dened as
lacking extrinsic dimensions. On the other hand, reciprocity and utility/learning are likely to lie along the
continuum, because both share features of internal and external motivations. Our hypotheses aim to assess
the relative importance of these various motivations in driving OSS contributions, while acknowledging that
agents may be driven by more than one motivation type. We proceed by discussing the empirical implication
of each motivation class, and we suggest testable hypotheses.
Our analysis is an e¤ort to document, within a set of OSS developers, systematic patterns of behavior that
are consistent with the predictions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation theory. We examine how developers
respond to di¤erent choices of project characteristics to infer underlying motivations, as well as to study the
implications of di¤erent business model choices by project managers (e.g., property rights, intended audience,
and project size) for the ow of source code contributions and the resulting project performance.
Pure intrinsic motivation. As discussed earlier, a salient feature of OSS is that many developers have a
strong ideological preference for keeping source code fully open. In economic terms, this feature means that
for a developer a¢ liated only with open projects, the utility derived from making a source code contribution
is larger if it is for an open project. In the extreme case, this utility would be zero if the contributions were
made to a project with any other license type. In psychological terms, purely motivated developers should
achieve greater levels of autonomy through acting in accord with self-endorsed values, needs, and intentions,
as well as a stronger sense of ideological relatedness to the relevant OSS community. Because reputation
is strongly associated with extrinsic motivation, anonymous developers, for whom reputation plays no role,
are best viewed as intrinsically motivated. For that reason, we expect their pattern of contributions to be
similar to that of open developers. This discussion leads to our rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a (intrinsic motivation, open/anonymous developers): Open (closed) projects should receive
more (fewer) contributions from anonymous and open developers.
This aspect of the intrinsic motivation hypothesis predicts positive (but not necessarily exclusive) sorting
of open developers to open-license projects. That is, more intrinsically motivated developers (those more
likely to be anonymous, or open developers who are members of projects with highly open licenses) would
be more likely to contribute to projects with highly open licenses.
The debate between advocates of open source and proprietary software has been polarized, with strident
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criticism from both sides of the divide. In this context, some developers might be ideologically motivated
against contributing to highly open projects, whose licenses may be viewed as anti-property rights.2 To the
extent that this view is widely held, the ideological motivation may also induce sorting by closed developers.
This type of sorting should be considered a form of intrinsic motivation, because it is ideologically based.
This discussion leads to the following:
Hypothesis 1b (intrinsic motivation, closed developers): Closed (open) projects should receive more
(fewer) contributions from closed developers.
Reputation. The reputation-related motivations in OSS communities have been well documented (e.g.,
Hertel et al., 2003). These benets are much more starkly extrinsic, because the way in which status
and respect from the other members of a community may motivate contributors is clear. However, their
importance in comparison to other types of motivation is subject to debate. Lerner and Tirole (2002)
argue that developers improve their labor market prospects by signaling their quality through participation
in open source projects. These signaling benets are likely to be greater: (1) when the project to which
they contribute is larger and more visible (Johnson, 2002); (2) when the project reveals the outcome of the
contribution, for example, by being accepted by the project manager; (3) when the project is sponsored
by commercial rms; and (4) when the project is aimed at developer-users rather than end users. The
prediction of the commercial reputation (labor market signaling) hypothesis is that closed developers should
sort positively on these dimensions. Importantly, because reputational benets clearly should not matter to
anonymous contributors, this group can serve as a benchmark against which reputation e¤ects are evaluated.3
The second type of reputation gain is peer recognition, which is unrelated to labor market payo¤s. Peer
recognition should also be greater for larger projects, those that reveal whether the project manager has
accepted the code contribution (public resolution), and those aimed at programming tools used by other
developers rather than by end users. Moreover, among non-anonymous developers, we expect reputation to
be less important for contributors who sort (primarily) into open projects, because intrinsic motivation plays
a more important role for them. By contrast, extrinsically motivated (closed) developers should be more
attracted to more visible projects, where their gains from reputation are likely to be greater. This discussion
leads to the following set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a (reputation, project size): All developer types, except anonymous, should be more likely
2The highly open GPL license is also known by some open source advocates as copyleft to emphasize this anti-property-
rights perspective.
3For recent work in open innovation outside the OSS which underscores the reputational e¤ects for innovation activity, see
Boudreau et al. (2011) and Jeppesen and Lakhani (2010).
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to contribute to larger projects.
Hypothesis 2b (reputation, visible contribution outcome): All developer types, except anonymous, should
be more likely to contribute to projects that reveal outcomes of contributions (public resolution). Anonymous
developers should either be una¤ected by public resolution, or be negatively a¤ected if public resolution
crowds out their intrinsic (ideology) motivation.
As proposed by Lerner and Tirole (2002), commercial sponsorship of a project can increase e¤ectiveness
of labor market signaling by developers, which should make such projects more attractive to extrinsically
motivated developers. Thus:
Hypothesis 2c (reputation, corporate sponsorship): Closed developers should be more likely to contribute
to projects sponsored by corporations. However, anonymous and open developers should either be unaf-
fected by corporate sponsorship, or be negatively a¤ected, if corporate sponsorship crowds out their intrinsic
motivation (ideology).
Finally, reputation gains are likely to be greater when the developers peer group is more able to un-
derstand the technical merit of her contributions, both for reputation in the labor market and for peer
recognition. To the extent that reputation is valuable to extrinsically motivated developers, we expect these
gains to be larger when the intended audience is other software developers rather than end users. This
discussion leads to the following:
Hypothesis 2d (reputation, intended audience): Both open and closed developers should be more likely
to contribute to projects that are intended to be used by developers (as opposed to end users). Anonymous
developers should not systematically sort on this dimension.
The above features, which a¤ect reputation-driven developers, are part of the business model the project
manager chooses. For example, the manager can choose project size by can determining the number of
members she wishes to admit. Moreover, the choice between niche and broad positioning of the project
will a¤ect project size. Hypothesis 2a suggests that more niche projects would attract developers that are
less driven by reputation concerns, making anonymous developers the ideal candidates for such projects. If
anonymous developers are also intrinsically motivated (Hypothesis 1a), the project manager should strongly
consider setting a highly-open license type.
Reciprocity. Survey evidence clearly points to the importance of reciprocity in driving code contribution.
Shah (2006) nds that one of the most important reasons for developers to contribute was a sense of reci-
procity. Aside from deriving satisfaction from developing a source code, contributors felt that helping others
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in the community was important because they had beneted from otherscontributions. Similarly, Lakhani
and von Hippel (2003) nd that reciprocity is the most important reason contributors cite for posting an-
swers on Usenet groups. Contributors either repay the benets they received or contribute in expectation of
beneting from the community in the future. This discussion suggests the following:
Hypothesis 3a (reciprocity, prevalence): Contributions from members of project i to project j in year t
should be more likely when members of project j have contributed to project i at some point prior to year t:
The earliest proponents of open source emphasized the role that reciprocity - sometimes called gift
culture- plays in sustaining incentives for innovation. Their argument is that developers who are members
of a project may make contributions in direct response to, or anticipation of, contributions other developers
make to their project. Importantly, reciprocity is typically viewed as a self-sustaining mechanism largely,
if not wholly, divorced from commercial considerations (e.g., Raymond, 2001). Therefore, we expect the
following:
Hypothesis 3b (reciprocity, non-commercial): Reciprocity should be more important for projects that
have highly open licenses:
At the same time, we have two reasons to suspect reciprocity is more important for commercial projects.
First, reciprocity can serve as an informal payback mechanism for developers driven by extrinsic rewards.
Second, in our context, economic theory shows reciprocity can be sustained if contributing developers can
detect and e¤ectively punish developers who deviate from reciprocity strategies. As we show in this paper,
developers that contribute to closed projects are typically concerned about their reputation, which makes
their identity more readily known and makes deviation easier to spot and punish. This discussion suggests
the following:
Hypothesis 3c (reciprocity, commercial): Reciprocity should be more important for projects that have
closed licenses.
5. Data
The data are taken from SourceForge.net, the largest web host for OSS projects. SourceForge provides a
publicly accessible platform, introduced in 1999, in which developers interact during the software development
process. We developed specialized software algorithms that accessed each project registered on SourceForge
over the period 1999-2010, and extracted all available information about the project, the participating
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developers, and their software source code contributions. The online Data Appendix provides a detailed
description of the data collection, as well as a number of consistency checks.
A contribution is dened as any contributed source code that aims to advance the software regardless of
whether the project manager ultimately accepts the submission. This denition is broader than that used
in past work that typically look at source code contributions that have been incorporated in the software
(e.g., Giuri et. al, 2010; Lerner et. al, 2006). We prefer the broader denition because of our interest in
studying how developers direct their programming e¤orts to di¤erent projects depending of their type and
project characteristics. We dene external contributions as source code submitted by developers who are
not registered members of the receiving project, and internal contributions as source code submitted by
developers to projects of which they are members. In the sample, 39% of contributions are internal. The
remaining 61% are external, coming from developers who are formally a¢ liated with other projects (but
not the focal project), are not members of any project, or do not reveal their identity when making their
contribution (anonymous developers). We focus the analysis of sorting behavior on the pattern of these
external contributions.
5.1. Main variables
The key variables in the empirical analysis are as follows:
Project License Type: The most important project characteristic we consider is license type. Each
project is governed by a set of rules that dene the terms of use of the software developed by its members
and other participants. These terms of use are dened by the project license, which focuses mainly on
the extent to which commercial use is allowed. Licenses that constrain such use more severely are referred
to in the literature on open source as more restrictive.We label the projects governed by these licenses
as open, because the impact of these restrictive licenses is to keep software free, in the spirit of open
software. Two main features dene the restrictiveness of a license: (1) the extent to which the source
code and any of its modications can be subsequently embodied in commercial software and (2) whether
modications to the source code have to remain open source (i.e., the binary source code must remain open
and accessible).4 The projects in our data cover about 44 license types. Using the description of each license
type (http://www.opensource.org/licenses), we classify licenses into three categories:
1. Highly Open (HO): This type includes the General Purpose License (GPL). It requires that any le,
regardless of source code origin, that is combined under certain circumstances with a le under GPL
4For a discussion of di¤erent license types and their restrictions, see Lerner and Tirole (2002).
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must be licensed under GPL. This license type is regarded as ideologically closest to the original idea
behind the free softwaremovement, and its objective is to preserve a fully open software commons
and limit commercial gains from software development to the maximum possible extent.
2. Open (O): The license requires that modied versions of the program can only be distributed if the
source code remains open, but it can be used commercially. The license conditions carry no restrictions
on the modications and extensions of the source code, provided it remains open source. Examples
include Lesser GPL, Common Public License, and Sun Public License.
3. Closed (C): The license allows modications and extensions of the open source code to be integrated
into commercial software, and these do not have to remain open source. Examples include BSD,
Python, and MIT.
In our sample, among projects that receive at least one code contribution 60% operate under highly open
licenses and 25% under closed licenses.5
Developer Types: We assign each developer a typebased on the types of projects to which she belongs as
a registered member. Project membership is an important decision that ties developers to specic projects.
This tie is likely to impact the developers reputation in the OSS community, and beyond, because her
association with projects becomes public information that can reveal her preferences to outsiders and link
her personal reputation to the future performance of the project. We classify a developer as open if all of the
projects to which she belongs operate under highly open licenses, as dened above. We dene a developer
as closed if all of the projects to which she belongs operate under closed licenses. All other developers who
are members of projects are classied as mixed.6 In addition, we use two other categories: Anonymous
developers are those who contribute without revealing their identity to the receiving project manager or
members. Non-membersare contributors who are not registered as members of any project.
Our sample includes 149,956 unique developers: 68% have no a¢ liation to any project, 15% are open,
9% are closed, and the remaining are mixed. Of the total sample of developers, 15% make at least one
contribution to projects with which they are not a¢ liated (external contributions) over the sample period.
Size of Project: The size of the project is dened by the number of developers registered as formal
members, including the project manager. Size is an important measure in our analysis because it is our key
5For 7% of the projects, we observe multiple licenses. In these cases, we classify the project as highly open if at least one of
its licenses is highly open, and as closed if all of its licenses are closed. The results reported in the paper are robust to alternative
assumptions, such as classifying projects as highly open only if all of their licenses are highly open, or classifying projects as
closed only if the majority of their licenses are closed. The remaining projects are classied as open.
6The majority of developers belong to very few projects the mean number of projects of which a member developer belongs
is 1.4 (median is 1, 99th percentile is 7).
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test of Hypothesis 2a on the reputation motive. Importantly, the project manager can potentially inuence
the size of the project by allowing more or fewer developers to become formal members. We show that this
decision has important implications for sorting.
The median project has one member and the average is 4.1. The distribution is sharply skewed, however
the project at the 90th percentile of the size distribution has 10 members (99th percentile has 37 members).
Larger projects receive more (external) contributions than small projects. Conditional on receiving at least
one external contribution, projects above the median size receive an average of 28.5 contributions, compared
to only 8.8 for below-median-size projects.
Intended Audience: SourceForge identies the intended audience for each registered software project
from among 19 groups. We aggregate these groups into ve categories for the empirical analysis: Developers
(programming tools), End Users, System Administrators, Mixed (of the preceding three), and Other.7 About
30% of projects receiving contributions are developer-oriented and 18% target end users.
In the econometric analysis, we also control in all regressions for project programming language and
operating system. The online Data Appendix provides details on these controls.
6. Econometric Specication
Our primary objective is to estimate the e¤ect of project characteristics on the pattern of source code
contributions. For this estimation, we rst aggregate contributions into cells, where each cell is dened by a
set of characteristics of the developer type and receiving projects. These cells become the observations in the
estimation procedure. The empirical task is to relate the number of contributions between di¤erent cells to
the characteristics of the developers and projects dening those cells. Because the number of contributions
is an integer, we use an econometric model for count data. We adopt a Negative Binomial specication:
Yc;r = exp(Xr + XcXr + cr) (1)
where Yc;r denotes the number of contributions from projects in cell c to projects in cell r; Xc is a vector of
characteristics of the contributing project c (including the developer type), Xr is a vector of characteristics
of the receiving project r; and we assume the negative binomial error is conditionally independent of the
characteristics in (Xc; Xr), E(cr j Xc; Xr) = 0: The model is estimated by maximum likelihood.8
7The End User category includes end users/desktop and advanced end users. The Othercategory, which accounts for 4%
of projects, includes mostly aerospace, education, science/research, and healthcare.
8The alternative, Poisson model imposes the strong restriction that the conditional mean and variance of Ycr are equal.
The Negative Binomial model allows for overdispersion of the form V ar(Yc;r) = E(Yc;r) + [E(Yc;r)]2 and estimates the
overdispersion parameter  along with the other parameters. Our estimates easily reject the Poisson case  = 0:
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As equation 1 shows, the regressions incorporate additive controls for project characteristics that are de-
signed to capture the linear e¤ects of unobserved project heterogeneity at the cell level. Our primary interest,
however, is in the interaction coe¢ cients between the developer type and the receiving project characteris-
tics, the 0s: These coe¢ cients describe how developers endogenously sort (i.e., target their contributions)
on the license type and other receiving project characteristics. We refer to these interaction coe¢ cients as
the sorting parameters.
We use the following dimensions to dene cells. The rst dimension is developer type. As explained
earlier, we infer the developer type from the developers project a¢ liations (membership). Using the con-
tributing developer type allows us to examine whether developers sort that is, target projects with specic
types of open source licenses. For the receiving project, we use ve characteristics: license type, intended
audience, programming language, operating system, and age. Project age is important because we measure
the number of contributions made over the entire life of the project and this will depend on how long the
project has been registered. Cell dimension are dened as dummy variables. An example of a cell is the
total number of contributions open developers make to projects with a closed license and a particular in-
tended audience, operating system, programming language, and project age. The total number of cells in
the regression equals the product of the number of developer types, intended audiences, operating systems,
programming languages, and project ages for which information on contributions is available. Some cells
have only dormant projects which receive no contributions over the sample period, in which case we drop
them in the estimation procedure.
As explanatory variables in the regressions, we include a complete set of dummy variables for the receiving
project characteristics, and the interactions of the receiving project license type and intended audience with
developer type. In addition, we include the average size (number of registered members) of the receiving
projects in each cell, interacted with the developer type, to allow for sorting by developers on project size.
We also control for the number of potentially receiving projects in the cell since that will a¤ect the ow of
contributions. We do not control for the number of potentially contributing developers because there is no
way to do this for Anonymous developers. This means that it is di¢ cult to interpret di¤erences in the levels
of sorting coe¢ cients across developer types. Our main focus will be on how each developer type sorts across
the various business model dimensions of the project, including license type, size, and intended audience.
We must normalize one of the coe¢ cients on the interaction dummy variables between developer and
license type (as we also control for additive e¤ects). The choice of normalization only a¤ects the interpreta-
tion, not the estimation, of parameters. We set the coe¢ cient on the open developerHO license interaction
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equal to zero, so all estimated interaction coe¢ cients measure impacts relative to this reference group, that
is, relative to the expected number of contributions by open developers to projects with HO licenses. Each
sorting coe¢ cient gives the impact of a unit change in the control variable on the expected number of con-
tributions, all dened relative to the number of contributions contributed by the open developers to projects
with HO licenses (the reference category). Sorting behavior by a developer type is revealed by comparing the
sorting coe¢ cients for that developer type across projects with di¤erent licenses and other business model
dimensions.
Our identication assumption is that the license types, and other project characteristics, are exogenous
with respect to the individual developers decision to contribute. The main concern is unobserved project
quality, which might be correlated with both the observed characteristics of, and the number of contributions
made to, a project. Our empirical strategy should be more robust to this problem, however, because our
primary focus is on the interactions between the contributing developer type and project characteristics,
the  coe¢ cients. Unobserved heterogeneity will induce bias only if it is correlated with these interactions.
While higher-quality projects may attract more contributions, why this should systematically a¤ect one type
of contributor more than the other is unclear. Nonetheless, in the robustness checks section we discuss a
battery of tests we performed to check the sensitivity of our results for developer and project unobserved
heterogeneity.
7. Descriptive Statistics
Developers in our sample make 103,712 external source code contributions. Table 1 shows how these contri-
butions distribute across developer types. Of the total, 31% come from non-members, 18% from anonymous
contributors, 14% from open developers, and 12% from closed developers. The remaining contributions
are from mixed developers. Mixed developers are the most active contributors, with an average of 11.2
contributions per developer. The least active developers are non-members, with only 2.1 contributions per
developer.
Table 2 summarizes key aspects of sorting behavior by developers. We nd strong sorting of contributions
on project license type. Both anonymous and open developers are much more likely to contribute to projects
with highly open licenses. More than 80% of anonymous developerscontributions go to such projects, with
a further 10% or more directed to moderately open projects. Open developers follow a similar pattern: two
thirds of their contributions go to highly open projects, with an additional 17% going to moderately open
projects. In sharp contrast, 36% of closed developerscontributions go to projects with closed licenses (as
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compared to 9% and 16% for anonymous and open developers, respectively).
We also nd strong sorting on the intended audience. Closed developers are 3.5 times more likely to
contribute to projects aimed at developing programming tools than to projects whose main audience is end
users. Anonymous developers, meanwhile, are almost four times more likely to contribute to projects aimed
at end users than projects targeting other developers. Open developers do not seem to favor either end-user
or developer projects. Lastly, closed developers sort more strongly on the size of the project compared
to anonymous or open developers. 43.9% of contributions by closed developers go to projects with more
than 10 members, the corresponding gures are 30.7% for open developers and only 17.7% for anonymous
contributors.
8. Econometric Results
8.1. Sorting by Project License Type and Intended Audience
Table 3 presents the estimated marginal e¤ects for the baseline model. We focus on the sorting coe¢ cients
that describe matching between the contributing developer type and the license and size of the receiving
project. We nd a strong sorting behavior by license type. Turning rst to column 2, open developers
are much more likely to contribute to projects that have highly open licenses than to those with less open
licenses. Changing the project license from highly open to open reduces the number of contributions by
open developers by 1.62, or 17.4%. Moving from an open to a closed license is associated with an additional
reduction in contributions by such developers of 0.34, or 3.7%. The 2 test strongly rejects the hypothesis
that no sorting occurs by license type for highly open developers (p-value< .001).
Career concerns cannot drive contributions by anonymous developers, because these developersanonymity
prevents gain from peer recognition or labor market signaling. Thus anonymous contributions indicate ei-
ther the importance of intrinsic motivation or pure utility/learning value from contributing. If they are
primarily intrinsically motivated agents, we expect them to sort on highly open projects, whereas the utility
value/learning incentive predicts no systematic sorting on license type. Column 1 shows that anonymous
developers sort in a way similar to highly open developers; both show a similar sorting coe¢ cient on HO li-
censes and a strong disinclination to contribute to projects with less open or closed licenses. The statistically
signicant, negative sorting on open and closed licenses (-2.20 and -2.95, respectively) shows this sorting.
These results for highly open and anonymous developers provide support for the pure intrinsic motivation
hypothesis, indicating that these types of developers attach value to the open source ideology that favors
highly restrictive (open) licenses. This evidence strongly supports Hypothesis 1a.
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We nd the opposite pattern of sorting by closed developers (column 4), who are much more likely to
contribute to projects with less open or closed licenses. For example, comparing the sorting coe¢ cients
for the C and HO licenses (-1.40 and -2.93, respectively), we see that moving from a C to an HO license
reduces the number of contributions by closed developers by 1.53. This represents an 18.7% fall in their
contributions at the cell level (= 1.53/8.2). Again, we decisively reject the null hypothesis that no sorting
by closed developers (p-value <.001) occurred. This evidence is consistent with Hypothesis 1b.
Interestingly, we do not nd any sorting behavior for mixed developers (column 3), who are registered
members of projects with di¤erent types of licenses. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no
sorting for these developers (p-value = .51). This indicates an indi¤erence to the choice of project license
type, both in their choices regarding membership and in their contribution activity.
Column 5 shows that non-member contributors exhibit sorting behavior broadly similar to (but less sharp)
open and anonymous developers. In particular, non-members sort toward highly open licenses. Moving from
an HO to a C license reduces by 11.6% the number of contributions by non-members.
We turn next to the impact of project size on the inow of contributions. Project size plays two roles.
First, the number of members who belong to a project may be a proxy for unobserved project quality, in
which case, larger projects would attract more contributions from all developer types. Second, project size
may be associated with more exposure and thus larger reputation gains. But these gains can come in the form
of greater peer recognition and/or in labor market signaling benets, and thus can be enjoyed both by open
developers and more commercially oriented, closed developers. Hence there is no theoretical prediction as to
whether open or closed developers should value project size more strongly. This is an empirical question.
We can distinguish between the project quality and reputation e¤ects associated with project size by
exploiting the anonymous developers. Reputation benets should not be relevant to anonymous developers,
but they may prefer higher-quality projects. Therefore, we can infer the impact of project quality on
contributions from the behavior of the anonymous type. Assuming that other developer types have similar
preferences for contributing to high-quality projects, we can identify the reputation e¤ect associated with
project size by taking the coe¢ cient on size for each developer type minus the corresponding coe¢ cient for
anonymous developers. We nd a statistically signicant e¤ect of project size for anonymous developers,
but the impact is not large. The point estimate of 2.66 implies that a 10% increase in project size raises
contributions by 0.27, which is only 2.2% of the average number of contributions at the cell level by these
developers. The fact that size matters at all for them, however, is interesting because it indicates that the
utility gains from contributing are related to project size (or project quality, for which it may serve as a
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proxy). Subtracting the point estimate for the anonymous developers from the size coe¢ cients for the other
developer types, we get the following estimates for how reputation gains are related to receiving project
size: 0.03 for open developers, 0.31 for mixed, 0.91 for closed, and 0.56 for non-members. These coe¢ cients
indicate that reputation gains for open developers do not appear to be related to project size, as we measure
it, but they are related for the other developer types, especially the more commercially oriented, closed
developers. This nding strongly supports Hypotheses 2a on reputation and project size.
To test Hypothesis 2d, on reputation and intended audience, Table 4 explores sorting patterns on intended
audience.9 We add interaction terms for each developer type with their intended audience dummies: devel-
oper tools and end users. The results show strong sorting on intended audience by both open and closed
developers. Starting with open developers, shown in column 2, moving from developer tools to end-user
projects is associated with an increase of 2.12 (= 0.65+1.47) in the number of contributions. This change in
intended audience type reduces their contributions by 22.8% (relative to the cell average number of contribu-
tions). Anonymous developers show a similar pattern. Moving from developer tools to end users raises their
number of contributions by 1.25 (= -1.56+2.81), or 10.3% of the average cell number of contributions. By
contrast, closed developers display a strong preference for developer-tool projects. Moving from end users
to developer tools increases the number of contributions made by closed developers by 1.91 (= 2.05-0.14),
accounting for 23.3% of contributions by this developer type. Interestingly, non-member developers continue
to be similar to open developers in terms of intended audience sorting, while the sorting pattern for mixed
developers is similar to that of closed developers.
Sorting by intended audience can be driven by other factors that are not related to reputational concerns.
We can control for their e¤ects using the sorting results for anonymous developers, similarly to what we did
with project size. Because reputation is not relevant as a motivation for anonymous developers, the sorting
coe¢ cient for this category picks up all the non-reputation e¤ects that are related to intended audience.
Thus, we can isolate the reputation e¤ect associated with sorting by intended audience by subtracting the
sorting coe¢ cient of anonymous for each developer type. This calculations yields a reputation e¤ect of
-0.87 (= -2.12+1.25) for open developers, and 3.16 for closed developers (=1.91+1.25). Standard errors on
these di¤erenced coe¢ cients indicate a statistically insignicant reputation e¤ects for open developers, but
a statistically signicant reputation e¤ects (at the 5% level) for closed developers.
These ndings provide partial support for Hypothesis 2d. We nd the predicted sorting by closed devel-
9Note that license type is highly correlated with intended audience, which makes identifying sorting by license type and
intended audience more di¢ cult. In our sample, 87% of end-user projects have a highly open license, as compared to only 31%
for developer projects.
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opers toward developer-tool projects, where labor market signaling benets are likely to be larger. However,
we also nd sorting by open and anonymous developers toward end-user projects, whereas we predicted that
open developers would favor developer tools and anonymous would not sort on this dimension.
8.2. Quantifying the E¤ect of Project License Type on Sorting and Project Performance
In this section, we demonstrate how information about individual motivations can be strategically exploited
by rms in choosing the openness of their project licenses. For this purpose, we estimate a project perfor-
mance specication to obtain estimates of the marginal productivity of di¤erent developer types. As our
measure of project performance, we use the number of times the project has been downloaded. Project
dissemination in open source is likely to be a main objective of project managers, and downloads are one
strong indicator of project quality.
We estimate a log-linear function that relates the number of downloads of a project i in year t, Yit, to
the aggregate stock of contributions it receives, Sit; and a set of other control variables, which we denote by
Z: The specication can be expressed as
lnYit =  lnSit + Zit + it
where  is a normally distributed error term that we assume to be independent of lnS and Z: In specifying
the appropriate aggregate stock of contributions, however, we do not simply add up all past contributions
regardless of their type. Instead, we treat di¤erent types of contributions as perfect substitutes but allow
their marginal productivities to di¤er. Specically, we use Sit = Jj=1jSijt, where Sijt is the stock of
contributions of type j for project i in year t:
Substituting this expression for the stock of contributions, we get the following estimating equation for
performance:
lnYit =  ln (
J
j=1jSijt) + Zit + it (8.1)
We need to normalize one of the  parameters we set Non members = 1;which means that the parameter
j represents the marginal productivity of the stock of contributions of type j relative to the marginal
productivity of contributions of non-members: The coe¢ cient  is the elasticity of downloads with respect
to the aggregate stock of contributions. Each stock is computed as the cumulative number of contributions
of the specied type from the projects inception. We include controls for intended audience, programming
language, operating system, and year of registration. We estimate this regression by nonlinear least squares
and report standard errors clustered at the project level.
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Table 5 presents the parameter estimates. In column 1, we begin with a simple specication using only the
total stock of contributions received by the project, regardless of source. We nd that project performance
is strongly related to contributions received, with a statistically signicant elasticity of 0.307. This estimate
means a 10% increase in the stock of contributions raises the number of downloads per year by 3.1%. This
underlines the importance of choices project managers make that inuence the ow of contributions.
The association between the stock of contributions and downloads hides an important variation. In
column 2, we break contributions into three separate stocks: internal contributions (from developers who are
members of the same project), external contributions (from developers who do not belong to the project), and
non-member contributions. The result is striking whereas the overall elasticity is virtually unchanged, at
0.31, the estimated marginal productivities of both internal and external contributions are much smaller than
for non-member contributions (which is normalized to unity). The estimated relative marginal productivity
for internal contributions is 0.34, only a third as large as for non-member developers, whereas the relative
marginal productivity for external contributions is 0.62. We cannot reject the hypothesis that internal and
external contributions have the same marginal productivity (p-value =0.08), but we strongly reject that they
are the same as for non-member developers.
Column 3 breaks the stock of external contributions into three types: open and anonymous, closed, and
mixed, and shows that the marginal productivities of these contributors di¤er sharply. The striking nding
is that the marginal productivity of open and anonymous developers is very similar to the reference category,
non-members, as evident by the coe¢ cient estimate of 1.10. By sharp contrast, closed and mixed developers
look very similar to each other but their marginal productivity is far lower than the other categories of
developers.
We now use these estimated parameters to compute the actual (not relative) marginal productivity for
each type.10 For non-members, our normalized category, the marginal productivity is 2.33, which means
an additional contribution from non-member developers is associated with 2.33 more project downloads.
The marginal productivity for anonymous and open developers is 2.57. For closed and mixed developers,
the marginal productivity is much lower at 0.25 and 0.26, respectively. We will now use these estimated
marginal productivities to compute the e¤ect of sorting on downloads.
This analysis reveals two key facts. First, contributions matter for project performance. Second, con-
tributions by intrinsically motivated (open) developers  for which the tradeo¤ between forgone property
10The marginal productivity of developer type j is computed as MPj = j YitJj=1jSijt
: We evaluate all marginal e¤ects at
the sample average values.
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rights and the ow of contributions is important have the highest marginal productivity. This result is
important for managerial strategy because it underscores the benets associated with designing business
models to tap into this highly productive part of the open source labor force. Managers must decide whether
these benets balance the costs of such sorting, which are the costs of forgone property rights a more open
license imposes.11
We turn next to compute the e¤ect of project openness on sorting and project performance. Let cl !L
denote the change in the number of contributions received that occurs when license type shifts from l to L;
holding all other characteristics of the business model constant. Let dl denote the sorting coe¢ cient for
developer type d and receiving project (cell) l: This parameter is the expected number of contributions by
all developers of type d to projects with license l; relative to the normalized group, which is contributions
by open developers to projects with an HO license (O;HO = 0): Then the e¤ect of changing the license
from type l to L on the total expected number of contributions is given by cl!L =
P
d(dL   dl); where
the summation is over the ve di¤erent developer groups. The respective e¤ect of this change on project
performance is pl!L =
P
dMPd(dL   dl); where MPd denotes the marginal productivity of developer d
(which is reported above).
Using these formulations and our estimates from Tables 3 and 5, we nd that moving from a HO to
C license leads to a loss of 15 contributions and 39 downloads per project (30% of median number of
downloads). Moving from a HO to O license leads to a loss of 7.8 contributions and 20.6 downloads (16% of
median number downloads). Moving from O to C projects reduces the number of contributions by 7.8 and
number of downloads by 17.4 (13% of median number of downloads). These calculations indicate the HO
licenses maximize the expected number of contributions and project downloads. Of course, this result does
not mean that managers should always choose HO licenses, because such licenses also involve constraints on
the ability to appropriate commercial returns from the project. But the computation shows that the type
of project license can make a real di¤erence to the ow and impact of contributions, and thus the rate of
innovation in OSS.12
11An interesting nding is the large marginal productivity for non-members (larger than any other developer type except open
developers), and the fact that they make the smallest number of contributions (Table 1, Column 4). A potential explanation of
this pattern is that non-member developers are generalists problem solvers the kind of knowledge workers that do not commit
themselves to a specic project by becoming formal members, but rather identify and solve high-quality problems (as indicated
by their impact on performance) in several di¤erent projects. Our sorting analysis shows that these generalist problem solvers
sort on license type and tend to prefer open projects. Our results imply that managers who wish to tap into these productive,
generalist problem solvers in open innovation systems need to use open licenses, which of course is costly in terms of forgone
property rights.
12Our results also have implications for the joint selection of di¤erent dimensions of the business model. We showed that
choosing a highly open license increases the share of contributions from intrinsically motivated developers. We also showed, in
Table 4, that intrinsically motivated developers sort on projects whose intended audience is end users. Therefore, to attract
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8.3. Extensions
In this section, we discuss two additional business model choices to rene our inferences about the role of
reputation.
8.3.1. Public resolution of contributions
Reputation building is likely to be an important driver of contributions (our previous ndings with respect to
the interaction between developer type and project size point in this direction). Our rst extension demon-
strates how the project manager can rather easily inuence reputation concerns associated with contributing
to her project. We exploit information on whether the receiving project announces whether a contribution
is accepted. After a developer makes a contribution, the project manager decides whether or not to accept
it and to make the decision public on SourceForge. The manager makes the decision separately for each
contribution, but projects di¤er in the degree to which they make these outcomes public.13 Thus, whether
to reveal the outcome of a contribution is a business model feature, which we show has strong consequences
for sorting.
We explore two theoretical predictions, both embodied in Hypothesis 2b. The rst is that anonymous
developersdecision to contribute should not be a¤ected by whether projects publish the decision, because
they cannot benet from any peer-based or commercial reputation gains. However, if anonymous developers
are also driven by intrinsic motivation (including open source ideology), publishing the outcome might be
viewed as an extrinsic motivation device that actually crowds out their intrinsic desire to contribute to
such projects. In this case, contributions by anonymous developers should be lower for projects with public
resolution.
Developers motivated by reputation should be more likely than other developers to contribute to projects
with public resolution. Thus we can test directly whether reputation matters by examining whether contri-
butions by non-anonymous developers are higher for such projects. However, because both peer-based and
commercial (labor market) reputations can be at work, we have no a priori prediction about which types of
developers should be most sensitive to public resolution.
To study these hypotheses, we dene a dummy variable equal to one for projects that reveal the outcome
these developers, we would expect managers of end user projects to be more likely to adopt HO licenses, as compared to other
intended audiences. Our data conrm this prediction. For end user projects, HO licenses are dominant: 87% have highly open
licenses, with O and C licenses accounting for only 5% and 8%, respectively. However, for developer tool projects, there is a
more even distribution across license types: 31% for highly open, 33% for open, and 36% for closed licenses.
13 In total, these projects receive 68,294 closed contributions, of which 14,147 (20.7%) have no reported resolution, 45,844
(67.1%) have an Accepted resolution, and the remaining 8,303 contributions get a Rejected resolution. Overall, 67.7% of
projects receiving contributions publish the resolution to some degree.
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for at least 50% of the contributions they receive over the sample period.14 With this threshold, we classify
71.1% of the projects as having public resolution. Projects that disclose resolution tend to be larger than
projects that do not (mean project sizes are 5.7 and 4.2, respectively; mean number of contributions received
are 16.1 and 7.8). We add this public resolution dummy as an additional dimension for dening the cells for
the estimation procedure, and re-estimate the baseline specication.
Table 6 presents the results. Our earlier ndings about sorting on license type are similar to the baseline
results in Table 3. Two new ndings arise here. First, the estimated coe¢ cient on the public resolution
dummy variable is positive and statistically signicant for all groups except anonymous developers. This
result conrms the hypothesis that reputation is a motivation for contributions, and conrms Hypothesis
2b. Public resolution has the largest impact for open and closed developers. The estimated coe¢ cient of
3.09 for open developers implies they contribute 60% more on average to projects with public resolution (=
4.01/6.7), while for closed developers the gure is 54% (= 3.15/5.8).
The second important nding is that the estimated coe¢ cient for anonymous developers is negative
and signicant. These developers do not value public resolution, which is consistent with the theoretical
prediction, because they do not enjoy the reputation gains. More striking is the fact that anonymous
developers are actually less likely to contribute to projects with public resolution, which indicates such
publication may crowd out the intrinsic motivation underlying anonymous contributions. This nding is
robust to using alternative thresholds for classifying projects as having public resolution.
8.3.2. Corporate sponsorship
Increasingly, large rms have invested substantial resources in open source development, including paying
employees to participate in such projects (Lerner and Schankerman, 2010; Fosfuri et al., 2008), and is
also likely to include sponsorship and other forms of involvement with projects registered on SourceForge.
Knowing which projects have substantial corporate involvement should help us pin down more sharply the
role of labor market signaling, as distinct from peer recognition. Moreover, corporate sponsorship is an
important decision of the project manager. Although it is likely to be associated with signicant monetary
benets, it is also likely to have implications for the types of developers that would choose to participate,
either as members or external contributors, in the project development. We explore this implication in this
section.
The main prediction (Hypothesis 2c) is that developers motivated by commercial reputation in particu-
14We also tried two alternative thresholds 25% and 75% to dene the dummy variable for public resolution. The main
conclusions from this analysis are robust to the choice of the threshold, though the parameter estimates di¤er somewhat.
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lar, closed developers should be more likely to contribute to projects with corporate sponsorship, conditional
on the license type of the receiving project. Corporate sponsorship should have a zero e¤ect on anonymous
developers, because labor market signaling plays no role for them, or a negative e¤ect if sponsorship is viewed
as an extrinsic payo¤ and crowds out of intrinsic motivation. Similarly, unless labor market reputation mat-
ters for open developers, we expect corporate sponsorship to either have a zero e¤ect on their contributions
or a negative e¤ect if they are motivated agentswith anti-proprietary software ideology.
SourceForge does not identify whether a project is corporate sponsored, or more generally the level
of corporate involvement. We sent an e-mail survey to registered members of the largest 1,000 projects
(measured by number of contributions received) listed on SourceForge to determine whether projects were
initiated by for-prot companies or not-for-prot organizations. We received responses for 217 projects,
but the information only allowed us to identify the status clearly for 93 projects. To augment the usable
sample, we performed extensive manual investigation of each remaining project to identify whether corporate
involvement was present, either directly or through o¤ering a proprietary product that incorporates source
code from the project. Because both forms of engagement provide opportunities to developers for labor
market signaling, we classify such projects as having a corporate sponsor.We also checked whether projects
had a clear not-for-prot mission. This investigation allowed us to increase the sample to 148 projects (there
are 45,687 contribution received by these projects).15
These projects are typically the larger and more active projects on SourceForge the median number of
members is 22, and these 148 projects account for about 45% of all contributions in the complete sample.
The distribution of contributions by developer types and corporate sponsorship (Table 7) shows clear sorting
behavior. Anonymous developers target 86% of their contributions to not-for-prot projects, while 79% of
contributions by closed developers go to corporate-sponsored projects. Open developers favor not-for-prot
projects (55%), but this sorting is weaker. This pattern indicates some role for signaling and other labor
market considerations even for open developers.16
To analyze sorting on corporate sponsorship more formally, we estimate a Probit model that relates
whether a contribution goes to a corporate project (dependent variable equal to one) or a not-for-prot
project, conditional on dummy variables for developer type and receiving project characteristics.17 Table 8
15 Importantly, not-for-prot was not our default option. To be so classied, a project had to indicate clearly a non-commercial
intent in its mission on its website or the various online forums we examined, and no company support (or stated intention to
seek it) could exist, nor any commercial products we could identify as building on the project.
16One example of a project to which both open and closed developers contribute is Jboss. This project is incorporated in
RedHats products, such as Jboss Entreprise Middleware. Interestingly, anonymous contributors are the only type that almost
never contribute to this project, conrming their strong intrinsic motivation in favor of highly open (and non-corporate) projects.
17We do not adopt the cell framework in this section because, despite the large number of contributions covered by the
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summarizes the results and conrms the pattern found in Table 7. In column, 1 we include only dummies for
developer types. Closed developers are 32.4 percentage points (or 65.7%, evaluated at the sample mean) more
likely than open developers to contribute to corporate projects. Anonymous developers are 36.2 percentage
points (or 73.4%, evaluated at the sample mean) less likely than open developers to engage with corporate
projects. In column 2, we add a control for project size and nd the same pattern of results. In column
3, we add dummies to control for the license type of the receiving project and nd no signicant change.
Interestingly, the estimates also show that corporate projects are least likely to use a highly open license. In
column 4, we add dummy controls for the intended audience, programming language, and operating system
of the receiving project. Even with these controls, we nd the same sorting of closed developers toward
corporate projects, relative to open developers, but the magnitude is smaller by about half. In addition,
with these controls, the di¤erence between anonymous and open developers vanishes. These results strongly
conrm Hypothesis 2c.
8.4. Evidence on Reciprocity
In this section we analyze the role of reciprocity in open source innovation. Early proponents of open source
software argued that reciprocity was an important motive for developers to contribute, and one that would
be self-sustaining (e.g., Raymond, 2001). Similar claims have been made in other, so-called gift-culture,
settings. However, to our knowledge, this is the rst empirical evidence of reciprocity in the software context.
We focus on reciprocity at the project level and dene a contribution to project j in year t from a
developer who is a member of project i as reciprocal if project i received a contribution from j prior to year
t. We measure the degree of reciprocity as the percentage of all contributions made by project i that go to
projects that previously contributed to it.
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics on reciprocity. Three features stand out. First, reciprocity is rare
at the project level. For the complete sample, only 4.9% of active projects (those that receive at least one
contribution) are engaged in reciprocity (Column 1). However, these tend to be larger projects, accounting
for 37% of total contributions received (Column 2). Second, closed projects are more likely to involve
reciprocity 7.5% for closed versus 4% for highly open projects (Column 2). This is also true in terms of the
percentage of contributions closed projects with reciprocity account for 74.8% of received contributions,
compared to 20.6% for highly open projects (Column 3). Finally, whereas only a small minority of projects
projects in this restricted sample, the degrees of freedom used for cell construction dependent almost solely on the number of
receiving projects, regardless of how many contributions they receive. In the current sample, we have only 148 (mostly large)
projects, which is too few to meaningfully break up by bundles of project characteristics.
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engage in reciprocity, it plays a large role for those that do. Among those projects, 44.6% of all contributions
made are reciprocal; this is again most pronounced for closed projects (Column 4).
We proceed by estimating Probit regressions of whether a contribution is reciprocal. To control for project
similarity, we include a set of dummy variables that capture whether the projects match on license type,
programming language, operating system, and intended audience. We also control for additive dummies
for each of these dimensions. Table 10 presents the results, which conrm the non-parametric evidence
from Table 9. Column 1 shows that reciprocity is more likely when there is matching on license type and
intended audience. The impacts are substantial, especially for license type matching on license type raises
the likelihood of reciprocity by 12 percentage points, or 64.2% of its sample mean. However, matching on
programming language or operating system does not a¤ect reciprocity. This suggests that reciprocity is not
primarily driven by project similarities that reduce the cost of making contributions. These results continue
to hold when we include the size of the projects (column 2). In column 3, we look more closely at matching
on license type, including separate dummy variables for matching on di¤erent types of licenses. What is
striking is that reciprocity is much higher when there is matching on closed licenses, but we nd no e¤ect
when projects are matched on more open license types.
These results are not consistent with Hypothesis 3a, because reciprocity is not the prevalent mechanism
driving contributions, though it is important for some projects. Further, our ndings that reciprocity is
more important for closed projects conrms Hypothesis 3c, but not 3b. From a business standpoint, our
reciprocity analysis shows that when managers choose a closed project license, they help create conditions
that support a reciprocal relationship formation with other developers and projects, which shapes the pattern
of future source code exchanges.
8.5. Robustness Analysis
This section summarizes robustness analysis we performed to address concerns about potential endogeneity
issues. The detailed set of results from this analysis is provided in the online appendix. A short summary of
the approaches we take to address endogeneity is presented in Table 11.
Developer experience
Our main specications do not control for within-cell developer heterogeneity. To check the sensitivity of
our results, we control for developer experience. Experience is dened as the stock of contributions made by a
developer up to the date of the focal contribution. We nd that sorting behavior is actually stronger for more
experienced developers (Table A2 in the online appendix). Among the most experienced developers (top
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quartile), open developers direct 95% of their contributions to highly open projects, and closed developers
direct 86% of their contributions to closed projects. For the lowest quartile, these gures are 73% and 45%.
Finding that sorting increases with the level of experience is an important result because it shows that
the labor market implications of property rights choice are especially strong for the more experienced (and
presumably higher quality) developers.
To examine further the robustness of our results to developer experience, we add an experience control
in our baseline estimation (Table A3a in the online appendix). In this analysis, we are forced to exclude
the anonymous category and calculate for each cell the average level of developer experience. We nd that
experience has a strong positive e¤ect on the propensity to contribute, as expected. Importantly, sorting by
license type remains robust.
Lastly, because we nd that the least experienced developers have the weakest sorting pattern, we are
concerned that in the pooled regression the sorting parameters may reect di¤erences between the highly
experienced and the least experienced developers. To mitigate this concern, we estimate our baseline speci-
cation for a sample that excludes the least experienced developers. The sorting parameter estimates remain
robust (Table A3b in the online appendix).
Matching on programming skills and software architecture
An important concern is that the observed sorting behavior might be inuenced by similarity in program-
ming language or software architecture, which developers seek to exploit but which might be correlated with
project license type. If developers are matching their skills to the programming language or software archi-
tecture (e.g., operating system), we might be confounding the mechanism that induces sorting. To address
this concern, we estimate our baseline specication (from Table 3) at the contributing and receiving project
level. In this specication, we dene cells on the basis of the characteristics of the project from which the
contribution is coming and the project to which it is directed (this increases the number of cells to 374,808).
The contributing project is the project with which the developer making the source code contribution is
a¢ liated as a registered member. Cells now include detailed information on additional dimensions that
can drive contribution, such as contributing and receiving programming language, operating systems and
intended audience (in the baseline specication, the only control we included for contributing characteristics
was developer type). We include complete sets of dummies for all of these contributing and receiving charac-
teristics. In this analysis, we cannot include contributions made by anonymous and non-member developers,
which is one of the main reasons we do not use this specication as our main analysis. Column 1 in Table
A4 (online appendix) shows that strong sorting on license type also holds when controlling for linear e¤ects
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of receiving and contributing programming language, intended audience and operating systems.
To address the concern that matching by programming language drives sorting, Column 2 in Table
A4 includes a dummy that equals 1 for cells containing a matching on programming language; that is,
the programming language of the contributing project is the same as the programming language of the
receiving project. The coe¢ cient estimate on this dummy is, not surprisingly, positive and highly signicant.
Our ndings on matching on license type remain robust. Column 3 allows matching to vary by specic
programming languages by adding ve dummy variables for matching by programming language separately
for each language category. Sorting by licensing type remains robust.
Our next test constructs a measure of the proximity between each pair of programming languages, in
the spirit of Ja¤e (1986). Let Tl = (t1;:::;t5); where ti is the share of contributions that projects using
programming language l receive from projects that use language i. The proximity between languages l and
l0 is the (uncentered) correlation coe¢ cient between Tl and Tl0: This measure varies between zero and one
with higher values representing closer proximity. We include this measure as a control in the regression. The
estimated marginal e¤ect of this measure is positive and highly signicant as shown in Column 3. However,
our results of sorting by license type remain robust.18
Lastly, Column 5 presents the results of the most exible specication we can estimate in this context,
where we include a complete set of dummy variables for all possible combinations between pairs of con-
tributing and receiving programming languages. The license type sorting parameters remain robust in this
specication as well.
Project quality
We have no obvious reason to expect that unobserved project quality is systematically correlated with
the interaction between project license and developer type. Nonetheless, we check robustness by introducing
two direct measures of project quality. The rst is the cumulative number of project downloads prior to the
year of contribution. The second is the lag between contributing year and project registration year. The
idea behind this second measure is that higher quality projects are more likely to attract contributions for
a longer period of time (rather than just when the project is launched). In the baseline analysis, we did not
use information on the year of contributions in the denition of cells. However, to conduct these additional
tests, we need to redene cells more nely, including the year of contribution as an additional dimension.
18To check further the robustness of our results, we construct an additional Ja¤e-type measure, which is based on the distri-
bution of contributing developers. The idea behind this measure is that two programming languages are likely to be closer if
the distributions of contributions received from individual developers are more similar. The length of the new vector is n, where
n is the total number of contributing developers in our sample. Including this developer-level proximity measure does not a¤ect
the sorting parameters
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The main results on sorting hold when we introduce these controls for project quality (results are omitted
for brevity). We nd that past cumulative downloads are positively, and signicantly, related to the number
of contributions received by a project in a given year consistent with downloads being an indicator of project
quality but we nd no statistically signicant e¤ect for the contributions lag. Importantly, the pattern and
magnitude of sorting are robust to these controls.
Variation over time and removing outliers. Corporate involvement in the open source community has
been increasing, which may be a reection of a less sharp ideological divide between the open source and
proprietary software communities. Therefore, we check the sensitivity of the sorting e¤ects to temporal
shifts. We estimate the baseline model separately for the periods 19992005 and 20062010, based on
project registration year. We nd that sorting on license type holds for both periods, but sorting is actually
stronger in the 20062010 period.
Lastly, the distribution of contributions is highly skewed a few projects receive a large fraction of con-
tributions, and a few developers make a signicant share of contributions. Because unobserved heterogeneity
may be present in these groups, we check the robustness of the results to removing outlier projects and
developers. We drop projects that receive a very large number of contributions and developers who make
a very high number of contributions (in each case, we winsorize at the 99th percentile). In both cases, the
same pattern of sorting continues to hold.19
9. Concluding Remarks
This paper demonstrates that business model design has important labor market implications, especially
when intrinsically motivated workers are signicant elements in the labor force. We show that there is an
important tradeo¤between stronger property rights associated with certain types of licenses, which managers
choose, and the ow of contributions the project receives from the most productive, intrinsically motivated,
developers. Using a large dataset on the pattern of contributions in OSS, we nd that di¤erent types of
developers sort strongly on observed project characteristics most notably, openness of the license, intended
audience, project size, and corporate sponsorship. The pattern of sorting behavior points to an important
role for intrinsically motivated agents, as well as reputation, especially commercial reputation for closed
developers. We nd an important role for reciprocity, but only for a small set of projects and commercially
oriented developers. We show how managers can strategically exploit this sorting behavior to improve the
19To check the sensitivity of our results to empty cells (zero values), we re-estimate our baseline model using a Zero-Inated
Negative Binomial model (ZINB). The sorting parameters remain robust. Importantly, we do not reject the Vuong test for
whether ZINB is preferred over Negative Binomial (p-value=0.97).
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performance of their projects.
There are two main directions for future research. The rst challenge is to understand better why
rms choose di¤erent business models in OSS, in light of our nding that open licenses have the benet of
attracting the highly productive, intrinsically motivated developers, but at the cost of weaker property rights.
The central question is why this tradeo¤ operates di¤erently for di¤erent rms. The second important issue
is to understand the economic and behavioral micro foundations for our nding that reciprocity appears to
be more common among commercially oriented projects, and to explore what this implies about the need
for formal property rights to facilitate technology exchange in open innovation systems.
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Table 1. Breakdown of Code Contributions: Developer Level 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








Anonymous NA 18,722 1,939 NA 9.7 
Non-members 15,133 32,293 4,071 2.1 7.9 
Open 3,211 14,326 2,026 4.5 7.1 
Mixed 2,308 25,802 1,784 11.2 14.5 
Closed 1,860 12,569 1,356 6.8 9.3 
Internal Contributors 
Open 1,184 11,213 581 9.5 19.3 
Mixed 1,026 21,769 592 21.2 36.8 
Closed 474 9,822 277 20.7 35.5 
Notes: This table reports the breakdown of contributions by developer type. Developer types are as follows: Anonymous – developers 
who do not reveal their identity when making code contributions; Open – developers who are only members of projects with highly 
restrictive licenses; Closed – developers who are only members of projects with unrestrictive licenses; Mixed – developer who are 
members of both highly restrictive and unrestrictive projects; Non-members – developers who do not belong to any project, but whose 
identity is known. Project size is defined as the number of registered members. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of Code Contributions by Developer Type and Receiving Project Characteristics (%) 
  Contributing developers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Anonymous  Open Closed Mixed Non-members 
License Type 
High Open 81.3 67.0 37.6 45.6 57.5 
Open 9.9 16.9 26.0 35.0 21.2 
Closed 8.8 16.2 36.4 19.4 21.3 
Intended Audience 
Developers 8.5 21.7 35.6 40.6 24.1 
End-users/Desktop 32.6 24.0 10.2 11.0 42.7 
Other 58.9 54.3 54.2 48.4 33.2 
Project Size 
1–5 73.1 49.3 38.4 37.9 37.7 
6–10 9.2 20.0 17.7 19.4 22.5 
11–50 16.9 26.6 36.9 38.1 34.8 
> 50 0.8 4.1 7.0 4.6 5.0 
Notes: This table reports the distribution of code contributions by developers of different types and receiving project characteristics. 
We exclude internal contributions – contributions from developers to projects of which they are members. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Receiving project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 2.19 0.00 0.47 -2.93** 5.08**
(2.34) (0.82) (0.46) (1.42)
Open (O) -2.20** -1.62** 0.99 -2.03** 2.10*
(0.70) (0.57) (1.18) (0.60) (1.16)
Closed (C) -2.95** -1.96** 0.59 -1.40** -2.65**
(0.38) (0.41) (0.97) (0.62) (1.07)
ln(Number of members) 2.66** 2.69** 2.97** 3.57** 3.22**
(0.45) (0.47) (0.46) (0.49) (0.42)
Average # contributions per cell 12.1 9.3 16.7 8.2 21.0
H0: HO=C p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.51 p<0.001 p=0.51
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) on the interaction terms between the contributing 
developer type and license type and number of members of the receiving project. The regression includes complete sets of linear 
dummies for receiving project year of registration, intended audience, operating system, and programming language. We also 
include a linear control for the number of projects in the cell. We reject the following hypotheses: The coefficient estimates on 
Intended Audience=0 (p-value<0.001), Programming Language=0 (p-value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 (p-value<0.001), Size 
coefficients are equal (p-value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter estimate is 3.20 (0.016). The marginal effect of the number of 
receiving projects in a cell is 0.19 (0.018). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * 
significant at 5%.
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=7,705)
Table 3. Sorting on License Type
Developer type
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Receiving project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 3.56** 0.00 0.54 -2.95** 5.08**
(1.14) (0.70) (0.35) (1.23)
Open (O) -1.03 -1.39** 0.35 -2.30** 2.78*
(0.67) (0.45) (0.83) (0.45) (1.23)
Closed (C) -2.06** -1.83** 0.27 -1.72** -3.11**
(0.50) (0.36) (0.76) (0.52) (1.19)
Receiving project intended 
audience:
Developer Tools -2.81** -1.47** 0.46 2.05** -1.65**
(0.39) (0.057) (0.85) (0.72) (0.54)
End Users -1.56** 0.65 -1.28* 0.14 0.53
(0.62) (0.99) (0.66) (0.67) (0.96)
ln(Number of members) 2.47** 2.65** 2.95** 3.58** 3.14**
(0.36) (0.030) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32)
Average # contributions per cell 12.1 9.3 16.7 8.2 21.0
H0: HO=C p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.08 p<0.001 p<0.001
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) on the interaction terms between the contributing 
developer type and the license type, number of members of the receiving project, and two intended audience dummies – developer 
tools and end users. The regression includes complete sets of linear dummies for receiving project year of registration, intended 
audience (excluding the linear dummies for the interacted Developer Tools and End Users categories), operating system, and 
programming language. We also include a linear control for the number of projects in the cell. We reject the following hypotheses: 
The coefficient estimates on Programming Language=0 (p-value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 (p-value<0.001), Size coefficients 
are equal (p-value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter estimate 3.17 (0.064). The marginal effect of the number of receiving 
projects in a cell is 0.19 (0.012). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 
5%.
Developer type
Table 4. Sorting on License Type and Intended Audience
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=7,705)
(1) (2) (3)
Elasticity: Total Contributions Stock 0.307**        
(0.007)
0.305**        
(0.007)
0.297**        
(0.007)
Marginal Productivity: Non-member  and anonymous Contributions 
(normalization) 1.000 1.000
Relative Marginal Productivity: Internal Contributions
0.344**        
(0.143)
0.346**        
(0.012)
Relative Marginal Productivity: External Contributions
0.620**        
(0.138)
Relative Marginal Productivity: Contributions from Open and 
Anonymous Developers
1.100**        
(0.183)
Relative Marginal Productivity: Contributions from Closed Developers
0.105**        
(0.030)
Relative Marginal Productivity: Contributions from Mixed Developers
0.111**        
(0.026)
Adjusted-R2 0.562 0.564 0.564
Table 5. Code Contributions and Project Performance
Dependent variable: ln(1+Number of Project Downloads)                                              
Non-linear Least Squares (N=34,007)
Notes: This table reports estimates from nonlinear least squares regressions of the log of project downloads on various stocks 
of contributions, plus dummy variable controls for project characteristics including intended audience, programming 
language, operating system, and project registration year. Projects that never receive downloads are excluded from the sample. 
We include a dummy variable that receives the value of one for observations where the number of downloads is zero. Standard 
errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
Table 6. Sorting by License Type and Public Resolution 
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=10,755) 
  Developer type 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members 
Project license type:           
Highly Open (HO) 1.39 0.00 0.72 -2.12** 3.15** 
  (1.48)   (0.57) (0.30) (0.79) 
Open (O) -1.47** -1.12** 1.92* -1.18** 2.51** 
  (0.44) (0.36) (0.93) (0.47) (0.99) 
Closed (C) -1.94** -1.37** 1.17 -0.74 2.19** 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.77) (0.50) (0.71) 
Public Resolution -1.13* 4.01** 1.83** 3.15** 2.31** 
  (0.62) (0.86) (0.60) (0.90) (0.49) 
ln(Number of members) 2.90** 1.40** 1.81** 2.06** 2.09** 
  (0.34) (0.22) (0.25) (0.29) (0.21) 
Average # contributions per cell 8.7 6.7 12.0 5.8 15.0 
H0: HO=C p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.27 p<0.001 p=0.27 
Notes: This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) of the interaction terms between the contributing 
developer type and the license type, number of members of the receiving project and a dummy for whether the receiving project 
publicly reports the outcome of code contributions. Public Resolution takes a value of one for projects that report resolution for at least 
fifty percent of the contributions they receive. We drop contributions for which a decision has not been made as of the data extraction 
date. The regression includes complete sets of linear dummies for receiving project year of registration, intended audience, and 
operating system. We also include a linear control for the number of projects in the cell. We reject the following hypotheses: Public 
Resolution coefficients equal (p-value<0.001), Intended Audience=0, Programming Language (p-value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 
(p-value<0.001), Size coefficients are equal (p-value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter estimate 3.20 (0.14). The marginal effect of 
the number of receiving projects in a cell is 1.01 (0.076). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 
1%, * significant at 5%. 
 
Table 7. Pattern of Code Contributions by Corporate Sponsorship (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Developer type 
  
Number of 
projects Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members 
Not-for-profit 73 85.8 54.8 35.7 21.0 21.3 
Corporate Sponsorship 75 14.2 45.2 64.3 79.0 78.7 
Total 148 12,134 5,529 11,922 10,658 5,444 
Notes: This table reports the pattern of the 45,687 contributions for projects with and without corporate sponsorship. 
 
Table 8. Developer Type and Corporate Sponsorship 
Dependent variable: Dummy for Contribution to Corporate Sponsored Project (N=45,687) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dummy for developer type: 
Open: reference category 
Anonymous 
-0.362**          
(0.147)
-0.288*           
(0.135)
-0.253*           
(0.123) 
-0.014            
(0.089)
Mixed  
0.339**           
(0.079)
0.278**           
(0.063)
0.198**         
(0.061) 
0.165**         
(0.045)
Closed 
0.324**           
(0.081)
0.274**           
(0.084)
0.227*          
(0.106) 
0.144*          
(0.063)
Non-members 
0.188**           
(0.072)
0.118*            
(0.062)
0.105            
(0.060) 
0.111**         
(0.043)
Dummy for license type: 
Highly Open: base category 
Open 
0.491**         
(0.112) 
0.303**         
(0.122)
Closed 
0.250**         
(0.148) 0.111         (0.171) 
ln(Number of members) 0.262** 0.083* 0.100** 
(0.053) (0.043) (0.037) 
Dummies for Intended Audience No No No Yes 
Dummies for Programming Languages No No No Yes 
Dummies for Operating Systems No No No Yes 
R2 0.212 0.250 0.361 0.443 
Notes: This table reports marginal effect estimates from (Probit) regressions for whether a code is contributed to a corporate project, 
rather than to a non-for-profit project. The dummy equals one if the contribution is to a corporate project, and zero if the contribution 
is to a non-for-profit project. Analysis is at the contribution level. We include only contributions to projects that we can clearly 
identify as either corporate or not-for-profit. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation 
through clustering by receiving projects. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and ** at the 1% level. 
 
Table 9. Pattern of Reciprocity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Receiving license 
type: # of projects 
% of projects with 
reciprocal contributions 
% of contributions received 
by reciprocal projects 
% of contributions from projects 
in (1) that are reciprocal 
All  256 4.9 37.0 44.6 
Highly Open 142 4.0 20.6 36.0 
Open 45 5.5 46.0 39.3 
Closed 69 7.5 74.8 50.7 
Notes: This table reports the pattern of reciprocity of contributions for projects with different license types.  This table includes only 
projects that receive at least one reciprocal contribution.  
 
(1) (2) (3)
Dummy for matching on license type:
All licenses
0.120**      
(0.027)
0.109**    
(0.025)
Highly Open (HO)
0.031         
(0.058)
Open (O)
0.061         
(0.075)
Closed (C)
0.547**       
(0.137)
Dummy for matching on intended audiences
0.054**     
(0.019)
0.045**     
(0.016)
0.048**     
(0.017)
Dummy for matching on Programming Language
0.012         
(0.023)
-0.037         
(0.021)
-0.035         
(0.020)
Dummy for matching on Operating Systems
0.049        
(0.027)
0.030        
(0.022)
0.032         
(0.022)
ln(Number of members), receiving 0.003** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001)
ln(Number of members), contributing -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Pseudo-R2 0.330 0.368 0.375
Table 10. Determinants of Reciprocity
Dependent variable: Dummy for Reciprocity (N=5,266)
Notes: This table reports marginal effect estimates from (Probit) regressions for whether a code 
contribution is reciprocal. The dummy equals one if the contribution is reciprocal and zero otherwise. 
The dummy variable for matching on license type takes the value one if the contributing and receiving 
projects have the same license. Other matching dummies are defined similarly.  Standard errors are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by receiving 
projects. * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, and ** at the 1% level.
Table 11: Summary of Main Robustness Tests to Address Endogeneity 
Source of potential bias   Approach 
1. Unobserved project 
quality 
1. Control for additive project characteristics using a complete set of categorical dummies 
and focus on sorting coefficients associated with interaction effects. Unobserved project 
quality induces bias only if it is correlated with these interactions. While higher-quality 
projects may attract more contributions, this should not systematically affect one 
contributing type relative to another. 
  
2. Introduce a control for prior cumulative project downloads as a direct (imperfect) 
measure of project quality. 
      
2. Unobserved developer 
quality 
1. Focus the analysis on sorting coefficients associated with interaction effects and control 
for additive project characteristics using a complete set of categorical dummies. 
Unobserved developer experience induces bias only if it is correlated with these 
interactions. While higher-quality developers may make more contributions, this should 
not systematically vary by receiving project characteristics (especially license type). 
2. Introduce a direct measure of developer experience, constructed as the stock of 
contributions made by a developer prior to the date of the focal contribution. 
3. Estimate our baseline specification separately for different developer experience levels. 
      
3. Unobserved technical 
links between cells 
(programming 
languages and operating 
systems) 
1. Re-estimate baseline model at the project (rather than cell) level, which allows us to 
control for both contributing and receiving project characteristics. 
2. Introduce dummy variables that capture matching between receiving and contributing 
project characteristics. 
3. Calculate a continuous measure of technological similarity between receiving and 
contributing project characteristics, in the spirit of knowledge spillover measures (Jaffe, 
1986) and use it as an additional control variable. 
 
A. Data Appendix
We developed specialized web-crawler software to extract information from the SourceForge website (a pro-
cedure that takes about a week to complete). We used two di¤erent versions of the software to implement the
extraction (due to changes in the website format): November 2005 and September 2010. In each extraction
we retrieved information for all projects listed on SourceForge, and all relevant information for each project.
This repetition allows us to check the consistency of information within and across projects over time.
The 2005 extraction covers 77,813 projects, while our nal 2010 extraction (on which the econometric
analysis is based) includes 215,072 projects, an increase of 76.4%. In the 2005 extraction, 4,086 projects
receive at least one internal or external contribution, which is 5.3% of all registered projects. In the 2010
extraction, the corresponding gure is 3.5% of all projects. There was also a shift in the distribution
of projects across license types, with closed licenses more heavily represented in the later sample. The
composition of the 2010 sample is: 46.7% Highly Open, 9.8% Open, and 43.5% Closed. The composition in
2005 is: 68.7% Highly Open, 15.2% Open, 13.5% Closed, 2.0% Public Domain, and 0.7% unidentied. This
shift toward projects with closed licenses likely reects the increasing involvement of corporate sponsorship.
The number of developers registered in SourceForge also increased sharply over time, from 113,191 in
2005 to 211,711 in 2010, an increase of 87.0%. Of those registered in 2005, 13.5% of developers made at
least one contribution in the 20002005 period. Of the developers registered in 2010, 12.3% made at least
one contribution in the 20002010 period.
We run checks for two distinct aspects of data consistency: 1) the risk that contributions from existing
projects are dropped by SourceForge (attrition of contributions), and 2) the risk that projects are dropped
over time by SourceForge (attrition of projects). Given that our econometric analysis focuses on the pattern
of contributions, attrition of contributions is the more serious concern as it is associated with incompleteness
of the history of the object of interest. The attrition may vary over time and thus can potentially bias our
results (e.g., younger projects have a more complete history le, and systematically have a di¤erent license
type than older projects). In cases of project attrition, however, we do not observe these projects in the 2010
extraction but, for those that are present, we have complete historical information on contributions.
Before turning to the details, we summarize our ndings briey as follows. First, we nd no evidence of
contribution attrition. For the projects in the 2010 extraction, the history les are complete (i.e., there are
no contributions registered for projects in 2005 that are missing in 2010). Second, we do nd evidence of
project attrition some projects active before 2010 were dropped from SourceForge and do not appear in the
2010 extraction. However, as explained below, we do not think that any systematic bias in our econometric
analysis is likely to be caused by this attrition.
We begin with project attrition between the two data extractions. Of the 77,813 projects registered
on SourceForge in 2005, 67% also appear in 2010. Of the active projects (those that receive at least one
contribution), the corresponding percentage is 83%. There are two main reasons why projects are dropped
from the sample over time. First, some projects were removed from SourceForge (for example, Arkipel
Project was active in 2005 but does not appear in SourceForge in 2010). Second, some projects change their
names, which makes it di¢ cult to identify them using automated name-matching. These projects are not
dropped from the data, and should not cause any bias in a single cross-sectional extraction. An example of a
name-changing project is ActionCube (its 2005 name), which appears under the name AssaultCube in 2010.
We turn next to contribution attrition the extent to which code contributions are dropped from regis-
tered projects over time. The 2005 data extraction includes 51,545 contributions, 85% of which also appear
in the 2010 extraction. Nearly all of the contributions that do not appear in the 2010 extraction are missing
because the projects themselves have been dropped. Only 200 contributions that appear in the 2005 data
and belong to projects that are included in the 2010 data extraction are missing from the 2010 data. That
is, while some projects are dropped from the sample over time, observing a project in a given year provides
very accurate information on the history of code submission. We conclude that there is no evidence of any
systematic time-inconsistency with regard to information on contributions.
There are two main reasons why contributions are dropped through project attrition. First, several large
projects were de-activated and their activity was transferred to other websites. For example, 55% of the
dropped contributions belong to Python, which moved to http://www.python.org/. However, during the
period that Python appears on SourceForge, we observe its complete historical and current contributions.
Second, some projects, such as Scons and Jython, do not provide access to their history in 2010, but did
provide access in 2005 (e.g., the site for Scons, http://sourceforge.net/projects/scons/develop, does not
provide information on submissions).
We also checked whether characteristics of the projects change over time. We turn rst to the project
license type. Of the projects in 2010 that were also registered before 2005, 93.3% have the same license type
recorded at both dates. A similar pattern holds for other project characteristics the gures for intended
audience and programming language are 94.1% and 83.8%, respectively.
Denition of programming language categories
Projects fall under one of 70 di¤erent programming languages. Based on discussions with software devel-
opers, we group these languages into ve broad categories: object-oriented, imperative, scriptive, dynamic,
and other (see Data Appendix for details). We also include a separate category for projects that do not
specify their programming languages (14% of projects). We use ve categories in the empirical analysis. The
programming languages in each are as follows:
Object-oriented: Java, C++, Smalltalk, Visual Basic NET, C#, Object Pascal, Delphi/Kylix, Visual
Basic, Ada, D, Groovy, PL/SQL, AspectJ, COBOL, JSP, LPC, REALbasic, Visual FoxPro, Zope, OCaml,
and Simula
Imperative: C, Fortran, Standard ML, PROGRESS, and Pascal
Scriptive: JavaScript, PHP, Tcl, Rexx, ActionScript, Emacs-Lisp, VBScript, Cold Fusion, AWK, and
AppleScript
Dynamic: Perl, Python, Dylan, Erlang, Forth, Lisp, Logo, Scheme, Lua, and Modula
Objective: C, Ruby, ASP.NET, Common Lisp, Pike, Prolog, Ei¤el, REBOL, and Euler
Other: Assembly, UnixShell, ASP, Haskell, APL, MATLAB, BASIC, XBasic, Euphoria, IDL, LabVIEW,
XSL, and VHDL/Veril
Denition of operating system categories
Each project is conducted on one or more operating system, which is the platform on which the program
runs. We use four groups of operating systems: Microsoft, Open Source Independent, POSIX, and Mixed
(see Data Appendix for details). We also include a separate category for projects that do not specify their
operating system platform (20% of projects). We use four categories of operating systems in the empirical
analysis. Using Lerner and Tirole (2002), Wikipedia, and http://osapa.org/wiki/index.php/SF/Freshmean
Trove, we group the operating systems into the following categories:
Microsoft : all of Microsofts operating systems (e.g., MS-DOS and WinXP)
POSIX : Linux, Solaris, and BSD
Open Source independent : any independent open-source operating system
Mixed : any software that operates on more than one operating system
Project performance
Beginning in 2006, SourceForge provides information that can be used to study projectsperformance.
We focus on projects that received at least one contribution between 2001 and 2010. We were able to match
66% of these projects to those used in our analysis of sorting. For the others, either the name of the project
changed or there was no available performance data. We measure project performance by the number of
times the project is downloaded. This is a good indicator of the extent to which the project di¤uses among
potential users and developers. We also used two other measures: the number of web hits the project gets
on the SourceForge site, and the number of the projects web pages that are viewed by users registered
on SourceForge (the latter is more likely to capture di¤usion among software developers). The qualitative
results with these performance measures are similar to those reported in this section.
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(1) (2) (3)
Table 3 Table 4 Table 6
Dummy for programming languages:
Dynamic 2.40** 2.21** 0.108
(0.99) (0.65) (0.58)
Imperative 7.10** 6.75** 1.93**
(1.83) (0.99) (0.81)
Object-Oriented 4.67** 4.52** 1.74**
(1.12) (0.70) (0.63)
Other -1.02 -1.02 -2.02**
(1.01) (0.62) (0.64)
Scriptive 4.12** 3.86** 2.71**
(1.25) (0.79) (0.89)
Dummy for operating systems:
Broad 4.34** 4.33** 2.72**
(0.75) (0.53) (0.56)
Microsoft 2.11* 2.12** 2.34**
(0.93) (0.61) (0.98)
OS Independent 3.13** 3.14** 1.68**
(0.71) (0.51) (0.55)
Posix 4.66** 4.63** 3.44*
(1.00) (0.60) (0.81)
Table A1. Linear Coefficient Estimates for Tables 3, 4, and 6
Dependent variable: Number of contributions                                              
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates of the linear controls for programming languages and 
operating systems which are included in tables 3,4 and 6 (but are not reported in these tables for brevity). The 
baseline category for programming languages and operating systems is "unknown". * denotes statistical 
significance at the 5% level, and ** at the 1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Mixed Closed Non-member
License Type
Highly Open 81.7 46.5 19.3 57.5
Open 9.3 33.0 14.6 21.2
Closed 9.0 20.5 66.0 21.3
Highly Open 95.3 47.0 8.0 98.4
Open 3.6 38.0 5.7 0.3
Closed 1.1 15.1 86.4 1.3
Highly Open 81.4 46.3 17.4 57.6
Open 9.6 29.3 18.8 22.7
Closed 9.0 24.5 63.7 19.7
Highly Open 73.0 46.0 36.3 56.7
Open 12.7 30.8 18.4 20.8
Closed 14.4 23.2 45.3 22.4
Contributing developers
All developers
Highly-experienced developers (highest quartile)
Inexperienced developers (lowest quartile)
Table A2. Contribution Distribution by Developer Experience to Different License Types (%)
Medium-experienced developers (second and third quartiles)
Notes:  Experience is defined as the stock of contributions made by a developer up to the date of the focal contribution.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 0.00 -0.30 -2.35** 5.46**
(0.43) (0.28) (0.94)
Open (O) -1.16** -0.08 -1.91** 3.75**
(0.34) (0.55) (0.33) (1.02)
Closed (C) -1.24** 0.14 -0.99** 3.95**
(0.31) (0.54) (0.39) (0.88)
ln(Number of members) 2.33** 1.72** 2.20** 2.74**
(0.27) (0.23) (0.27) (0.27)
Developer stock of prior source 
code contributions
Average # contributions per cell 9.3 16.7 8.2 21.0
H0: HO=C p<0.001 p=0.29 p<0.001 p<0.001
0.25**                                                         
(0.04)
Table A3.a. Controlling for Developer Experience 
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=7,705)
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) on the interaction terms between 
the contributing developer type and the license type, when controlling for developer experience. Experience is 
defined as the stock of contributions made by a developer up to the date of the focal contribution. Anonymous 
developers are excluded because we cannot calculate experience for developers that do not reveal their identity. 
The regression includes complete sets of linear dummies for receiving project year of registration, intended 
audience, operating system, and programming language. We also include a linear control for the number of 
projects in the cell. We reject the following hypotheses: Intended Audience=0 (p-value<0.001), Programming 
Language=0 (p-value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 (p-value<0.001), Size coefficients are equal (p-value<0.001). 
Over-dispersion parameter estimate 2.35 (0.08). The marginal effect of the number of potential contributing 
projects is 0.14 (0.01). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * 
significant at 5%.
Developer type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 0.00 1.37 -1.54** -0.30
(0.76) (0.39) (0.53)
Open (O) -1.38** 1.33 -1.02* -1.57**
(0.33) (0.96) (0.49) (0.37)
Closed (C) -1.32** 1.17 -0.63 -1.38**
(0.29) (0.82) (0.50) (0.36)
ln(Number of members) 1.55** 1.44** 2.00** 2.47**
(0.29) (0.27) (0.31) (0.33)
Average # contributions per cell 5.9 14.3 6.3 7.0
H0: HO=C p<0.001 p=0.72 p<0.05 p<0.001
Table A3.b. Removing Inexperienced Developers
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=6,164)
Developer type
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) on the interaction terms between 
the contributing developer type and the license type when removing contributions by inexperienced developers 
(lowest experience quartile). Anonymous developers are excluded because we cannot calculate experience for 
developers that do not reveal their identity. The regression includes complete sets of linear dummies for receiving 
project year of registration, intended audience, operating system, and programming language. We also include a 
linear control for the number of projects in the cell. We reject the following hypotheses: Intended Audience=0 (p-
value<0.001), Programming Language=0 (p-value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 (p-value<0.001), Size 
coefficients are equal (p-value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter estimate 2.35 (0.08). The marginal effect of 
the number of potential contributing projects is 0.14 (0.01). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.



















































































































Dummy for Same Programming 
Language
Dummy for Both Dynamic
Dummy for Both Imperative
Dummy for Both Object-Oriented
Dummy for Both Other
Programming Languages Distance
Measure
Number of contributing projects





















Note:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) of a model where "cells" are defined at the level of contributing and receiving project characteristics. 
The regressions include complete sets of linear dummies for receiving project year of registration which we do not report for space considerations. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary 























Table A4. Project Level Estimation: Controlling for Contributing Project Characteristics
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=374,808)
Baseline Project-level
Same Programming 
Language   Dummy
Complete set of Same 





















































































































































































































































Pseudo R2 0.029 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.031
Table A4 (Cont'd) . Project Level Estimation: Controlling for Contributing Project 
Characteristics










































































Table A4 (Cont'd). Project Level Estimation: Controlling 
for Contributing Project Characteristics
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, 
N=374,808)
Programming Language Interaction Dummies (Contributing × 
Receiving)
(1) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 2.86 0.00 0.19 -2.97** 5.18**
(2.89) (0.92) (0.52) (1.66)
Open (O) -2.08** -1.62** 0.72 -2.07** 2.15
(0.76) (0.57) (1.14) (0.63) (1.25)
Closed (C) -2.85** -1.96** 0.40 -1.44* 2.69*
(0.42) (0.42) (1.02) (0.65) (1.17)
ln(Number of members) 2.79** 2.68** 2.83** 3.52** 3.22**
(0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.49) (0.42)
Number of potential receiving 
projects × Developer type: 
0.14**          
(0.04)
0.19**          
(0.03)
0.22**          
(0.04)
0.20**          
(0.04)
0.18**          
(0.03)
Average # contributions per cell 12.1 9.3 16.7 8.2 21.0
H0: HO=C p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.78 p<0.01 p<0.01
Developer type
Table A5. Robustness Checks: Interaction Between Number of Potentially Receiving Projects and 
Developer Type
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=7,705)
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) on the interaction terms between the contributing 
developer type and the license type, when controlling for interactions between the number of potential receiving projects in a cell and 
developer type. The regression includes complete sets of linear dummies for receiving project year of registration, intended audience, 
operating system, and programming language. We also include a linear control for the number of projects in the cell. We reject the 
following hypotheses: Intended Audience=0 (p-value<0.001), Programming Language=0 (p-value<0.001), Operating Systems=0 (p-
value<0.001), Size coefficients are equal (p-value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter estimate 3.20 (0.16). Standard errors are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 0.00 0.64 -2.23** 1.52**
(0.59) (0.41) (0.61)
Open (O) -1.55** 0.09 -1.88** 0.33
(0.37) (0.65) (0.45) (0.55)
Closed (C) -1.58** 0.45 -1.46** 0.98
(0.30) (0.66) (0.45) (0.59)
ln(Number of members) 1.26** 1.74** 2.57** 1.23**
(0.27) (0.28) (0.36) (0.27)
Number of contributing developers 
in a cell
Average # contributions per cell 9.3 16.7 8.2 21.0
H0: HO=C p<0.001 p=0.72 p<0.05 p=0.16
TABLE A6. Controlling for Number of Contributing Developers
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (Negative Binomial, N=6,164)
Developer type
Notes:  This table reports the estimated marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) on the interaction terms between 
the contributing developer type and the license type when controlling for the number of contributing developers 
in a cell. We exclude anonymous developers because for them we cannot determine the number of unique 
developers. We also include a linear control for the number of projects in the cell. We reject the following 
hypotheses: Intended Audience=0 (p-value<0.001), Programming Language=0 (p-value<0.001), Operating 
Systems=0 (p-value<0.001), Size coefficients are equal (p-value<0.001). Over-dispersion parameter estimate 2.38 
(0.09). The marginal effect of the number of potential contributing projects is 0.14 (0.01). Standard errors are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
0.33**                                                         
(0.04)
(1) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Anonymous Open Mixed Closed Non-members
Project license type:
Highly Open (HO) 2.19** 0.00 -0.47 -2.93** 5.08**
(0.86) (0.62) (0.32) (1.11)
Open (O) -2.20** -1.62** 0.99 -2.03** 2.10*
(0.44) (0.42) (0.86) (0.45) (1.01)
Closed (C) -2.95** -1.96** 0.59 -1.40** 2.65**
(0.33) (0.35) (0.75) (0.51) (1.02)
ln(Number of members) 2.66** 2.69** 2.97** 3.57** 3.22**
(0.36) (0.31) (0.32) (0.34) (0.31)
Average # contributions per cell 12.1 9.3 16.7 8.2 21.0
H0: HO=C p<0.001 p<0.001 p=0.84 p<0.001 p<0.001
Developer type
Table A7. Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimation
Dependent variable: Number of contributions (N=7,705)
Notes:  This table reports the robustness of our results for  Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) estimation. The Vuong test for 
ZINB vs. Negative Binomal is -1.82 (p-value=0.97). The regression includes complete sets of linear dummies for receiving project 
year of registration, intended audience, operating system, and programming language. We also include a linear control for the 
number of projects in the cell. Over-dispersion parameter estimate 3.20 (0.07). The marginal effect of the number of potential 
contributing projects is 0.14 (0.01). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. ** significant at 1%, * significant at 
5%.
